Introduction and summary
M Some years ago there was an active debate over the optimality of market allocations in a mean-variance world, where the outputs of different firms are imperfectly correlated. Stiglitz (1972) and Jensen and Long (1972) initiated the discussion by using the capital asset pricing model to argue that the market allocates insufficient resources to risky activities. Fama (1972) claimed that their results were based on an implicit assumption of imperfectly competitive pricing and were, therefore, not particularly novel. Fama went on, however, to argue that even under perfectly competitive pricing, free entry would lead to a suboptimal number of risky firms, fewer than are warranted by the benefits of diversification. He attributed this to an externality in the production of risk. Merton and Subrahmanyam (1974) pointed out that there were no explicit nonconvexities in Fama's model, and that under constant returns, free entry would lead to an infinite number of firms, which is optimal. They recognized, however, without modelling it, that with production nonconvexities, the optimal number of firms is finite and the market result is suboptimal. Stiglitz (1975) undertook an explicit analysis of nonconvexities under Fama's assumptions of perfectly competitive pricing and free entry. Unfortunately, an error in the derivation of one equation' led his major results to be unduly ambiguous. The issues, thus, remain unresolved.
This article resolves these issues for a symmetric model as an example of the theory of product differentiation. We gain a key simplification by noting that each risky firm's mean output can be viewed as a (stochastically) differentiated product with its own (risk-adjusted) price. The optimal allocation of resources to the risky sector therefore requires marginal cost pricing of mean output.
But price-taking behavior cannot allocate the resources in the risky sector over the optimal number of activities. To do so the economy must push the benefits of diversification until they are balanced by the sacrifice of scale economies. This requires each firm to operate on the declining portion of its average cost curve, yet price-taking firms operate at the bottom under free entry. Thus, there would be an insufficient number of firms operating at an excessive scale, as Fama suggested.
Price-taking behavior, however, is not based on consistent conjectures in a world of product differentiation and free entry. Rather, consistent conjectures lead firms to act under the "large-group" assumption of monopolistic competition. Thus, marginal cost pricing does not hold, so insufficient resources are allocated to the risky sector. On the other hand, we do end up on the declining portion of the cost curve. Indeed, we shall show that under consistent conjectures we move farther up the curve than is optimal, with the result that there is an excessive number of firms operating at an inadequate scale, the opposite of the price-taking case.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the technology, preferences, and optimum conditions. Section 3 shows that Walrasian equilibrium does not exist in this model, as in all models of product differentiation with free entry and nonconvexities. As a consequence, previous literature has implicitly introduced a non-Walrasian equilibrium concept, which we also adopt. Section 4 analyzes this non-Walrasian equilibrium under price-taking behavior and shows that there is an insufficient number of firms. Fama's (1972) attribution of this result to externalities in the production of risk is incorrect, since the externality is pecuniary. It is also unnecessary, since there is no presumption of optimality for non-Walrasian equilibrium, even with price-taking behavior. Section 5 analyzes consistent conjectures and finds dramatically different suboptimalities, as mentioned above. Concluding remarks follow.
Technology, preferences,
and optimality * Consider a standard two-period economy. A fixed amount of resources, X, is to be allocated in period one among risky and risk-free investment activities, which yield output in period two. In the risky sector there are a very large number, N, of potential activities, only n of which will be undertaken. All potential activities generate mean output according to the common S-shaped production function 
where yi is mean output from risky activity i, and xi is the input allocated to that activity.
The production function f exhibits a nonconvexity over the initial range of mean output, so its associated average cost function, x/f(x), is U-shaped. Denote the elasticity of mean output with respect to input by n(xi) xitf'(xi)/f(xi); 71(x*) 1, A(X) < 0,
in the relevant vicinity of x*, where average productivity is maximized and average cost is minimized. Here, 02 is independent of i, decreases in n, and asymptotically approaches pE(E2), the market risk. This inverse relationship between 0 and n represents the benefits of diversification.
As usually stated, p is constant. It may be more realistic to suppose that as additional activities are undertaken, the field becomes stochastically "crowded," so projects increase in similarity, p'(n) > 0. This mitigates the inverse relationship between 0 and n. We shall, however, continue to make the substantive assumption that the inverse relationship holds over the relevant range, i.e., that the benefits of diversification are not exhausted.2
To complete the characterization of the production possibilities, suppose the risk-free sector operates under constant returns, where the output-capital ratio is r, a technological constant. We suppose that r <f' in the relevant range of xi to make the problem of allocating resources between the risky and risk-free sectors nontrivial.
Total output is given by
where Xxi are the total resources allocated to the risky sector and (X -X) are left for risk-free production. The mean and variance of output are given by Y=yi +r(X-X) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives and M denotes the marginal rate of substitution between mean output and risk. It will prove informative to identify an equivalent utility function, defined over the N potential goods yi, and the supply of resources to the risky sector, X:
2 Counterexamples are easy to construct, especially if the symmetry assumptions are relaxed. Consider three projects. The second project has zero correlation with the first, and the third project has .5 correlation with each of the first two. (The covariance matrix is still positive definite, but, of course, 6fl(n) is no longer independent of i.) In this example the average element of the covariance matrix does not decline with n: 02(n = 2) = E(E2)/2 < z 0?(n = 3)/3 = 5E(E2)/9.
The relationship 0(n), of course, depends on the array of activities selected. In this article we focus on the choice of the number of activities, rather than on the array. For convenience, we may suppose that the array is chosen to minimize 0, conditional on n. But see Stiglitz (1972 Stiglitz ( , 1975 Here Vi denotes the marginal utility of a unit of mean output from activity i, and -Vx is the marginal disutility of supplying resources to the risky sector (i.e., utility foregone from not using them to produce risk-free output). The value of yi in terms of X is given by pi. Expression (9) is readily identified as the certainty equivalent form of the capital asset pricing model (Copeland and Weston, 1979, chap. 7). In the capital asset pricing model literature, M/l is usually interpreted as the market price of risk, while E yjE(E1i?) is activity i's contribution to market risk per unit of yi. Thus, the bracketed term is the riskadjusted certainty equivalent of a unit of mean output from risky activity i. It is discounted by r to give the (present) value, in terms of current input, since current input can be transformed to future risk-free output at the constant rate r. In the presence of nonconvexities, it is typically the case that optimal (and market) allocations will be characterized by symmetric agents acting asymmetrically (Farrell, 1959).
Here, some of the potential activities will operate at a positive level, while the others will be inactive.3 The n active enterprises, however, will behave symmetrically among themselves. Thus, in our welfare optimum, we can drop subscripts and simplify summations. Equations (5) and (6) may be expressed in the two variables X and n: Y = nf(X/n) + r(X-X) (10) a2 = n202(n)f 2(X/n)(11) or a = n0(n)f(X/n) by using (1) and (3). Note that 0(n) is the coefficient of variation for the risky sector, i.e., the standard deviation per unit of mean output from the sector. Also, the value of mean output from any active enterprise simplifies from (9) to
by using (3) and (1 1). The risk adjustment is simply MO, since 0 is the risk per unit of mean output from the sector and M is the value of avoiding risk in terms of mean output. We can now quickly derive and interpret the optimum conditions. Substitute (10) and ( 11) into (7) and maximize with respect to X and n. The first-order condition for X is The left-hand side, Yfn represents the effect on mean output of spreading resources in the risky sector over more activities, thus reducing the scale of each. This is positive or negative, depending on whether we are in the region of decreasing or increasing returns, 11 5 1. The bracketed expression on the right-hand side, which represents Un, shows the two effects on risk of spreading resources among risky activities. First, whatever effect this has on mean output, (1 -i)f also affects risk by a factor 0, the coefficient of variation. Second, and this is the critical point, spreading resources over more risky activities reduces the risk per unit of mean output, 0'(n) < 0, which is the benefit of diversification. It is what puts this model in the same class as models of product differentiation, where diversity is valued.
Rearranging (14), we find that the optimal scale of risky activities satisfies 
Walrasian equilibrium does not exist
* In examining market allocations we shall first demonstrate that the Walrasian equilibrium concept is inadequate to analyze such an economy. We shall then show how the equilibrium concept has been modified by previous writers, and examine its properties in the next two sections.4 It will be convenient to express the argument in terms of the N markets for mean outputs, yi, and the supply of resources to the risky sector, X. Preferences over these commodities are defined by V, given in (8).
In searching for (nonexistent) Walrasian equilibria, we can confine ourselves to uniform price vectors, pi = p, for the mean outputs of all N potential activities. To see this note that if the price vector is not uniform, consumers will express the greatest demand for commodities with the lowest prices, while firms under free entry will choose to supply the commodities with the highest prices. Furthermore, since we have specified that there is a very large number of potential firms with access to the same technology (free entry),5 we know that if equilibrium exists, it must be at the price p* x*/f(x*), the minimum average cost of producing mean output. For if p < p*, no risky firms will be active, and if p > p*, all N potential firms will demand xd > x*. Free entry means that N is so large that such a demand for input to the risky sector, Nxd, would exceed the available supply, XS. Thus, the input market cannot clear unless p = p*.
At p = p*, each firm is indifferent between producing nothing and producing f(x*) of mean output from some activity. The equilibrium number of active firms, and activities undertaken, is found by dividing the resources consumers supply to the risky sector at that price by the input demand per active firm: n = XS(p*)/x*.
Of course, if this number is nonintegral, the input market cannot clear exactly, but this integer problem is well understood (Arrow and Hahn, 1971, chap. 7) and is not the point I want to stress.
Rather, the point that has gone unnoticed is the impossibility of equilibrium in the markets for mean outputs from the various activities. To see this note that the law of large numbers, 0'(n) < 0, renders preferences strictly convex over mean outputs from all N potential activities. Thus, at a uniform price vector, pi = p*, consumers will demand the same (small) positive quantity of mean output from all N potential activities. This is so since their budget constraint is linear in the mean outputs and does not represent the nonconvexities of the economy's production possibilities. Specifically, the Walrasian consumer's budget constraint is and that are imperfectly correlated with the others. If there are nonconvexities, the optimal number of activities will be finite, so the set of available, imperfectly correlated technologies need not be exhausted, and we assume that they are not.
Thus, while the input market may clear exactly if n is integral, and will in any case approximately clear, the same thing cannot be said for the output markets. Put another way, Walras' Law tells us that if the input market clears, or comes close, so will the algebraic sum of the excess demands in the output markets; but this algebraic sum conceals a large number of small excess demands, (16), and a small number of large excess supplies, (17). This is a far more serious existence problem than nonconvexities create for models of undifferentiated products, i.e., the integer problem.
The mean-variance literature referred to has not run into this existence problem, even though some of the work should have. The reason that this literature always finds an equilibrium is that the budget constraint (15) has been tacitly modified. Instead of allowing the first summation to run over all potential activities, 1 to N, the authors allowed it to run over only the activities undertaken, 1 to n.6 That is, an additional constraint, Yj =0, i > n, (18) is implicitly tacked on to the Walrasian constraint (1 5). Consumers do not express positive demands for commodities that are not produced, even though they would prefer to have all goods produced. These quantity-constrained demands spill over to commodities that are produced. In this way the literature establishes a non-Walrasian equilibrium where consumers are quantity rationed. This equilibrium is analogous to that analyzed in the Keynesian microfoundations literature (Hahn, 1978; Benassy, 1982) .
In my opinion this procedure is justified, at least until something better is proposed. Surely it is a weakness of the Walrasian equilibrium concept that it cannot be used to model such an important phenomenon as the law of large numbers, and, more generally, product differentiation. To persist in using the Walrasian concept, we would have to specify disequilibrium behavior, which would seem to lead to a host of further conceptual difficulties. This seems less satisfactory than the expedient of adopting a non-Walrasian equilibrium concept, as this literature has tacitly done. 
Non-
so the capital asset pricing model, (9), holds. Now, for simplicity, assume that each firm is restricted to a single activity.7 The profit of firm i is then 6 The mean-variance literature cited misses this because it neglects to write out the budget constraint. Rather, the first-order conditions are simply taken from the capital asset pricing model literature (where the number of activities undertaken is typically fixed) and applied only to the activities undertaken (the number of which is variable for the articles in question). Walrasian procedure would apply these conditions to all potential activities. In the product differentiation literature, Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) do write out the budget constraint in their equation (3), but it is specified to run from 1 to n, rather than over all potential products. vi pif(xi) -xi.
Under price-taking behavior active firms produce where Pif'(xi)= 1.
In equilibrium all n active firms produce the same amount at the common price given by (12). Consequently, equilibrium satisfies (1 3a), the optimality condition for the intersectoral allocation of resources. That is, under price-taking behavior, X is chosen optimally, given n. Fama ( 
so welfare could be increased by reallocating X over a larger number of risky firms.8 In effect, the market works to exploit fully scale economies (77 = 1) without any reference to the sacrificed benefits of diversification (6' < 0). Fama (1972) incorrectly attributes this result to an externality. To be sure, there is a pecuniary externality, as each firm's price, (1 -MO(n))/r, rises with the number of rivals, since 0'(n) < 0. Pecuniary externalities, however, do not cause suboptimalities, and there are no nonpecuniary externalities-each firm's production of mean output is independent of the others'.9
Rather, the suboptimality is characteristic of all (non-Walrasian) models of product differentiation. Under free entry price-taking firms operate at the bottom of their average cost curves, rather than optimally trading off scale economies against the benefits of product diversity. Of course, the usual treatment of product differentiation by the theory of monopolistic competition does not assume price-taking behavior.
Equilibrium under consistent conjectures
* Various types of price-making behavior have been assumed in theories of product differentiation. The Cournot assumption, for example, takes one's rivals' outputs as parametric. The Chamberlinian "large group" assumption of monopolistic competition takes as parametric some index of market output (including one's own). In recent years the concept of consistent conjectures has gained currency. It has been applied to the theory of duopoly for differentiated products (Bresnahan, 1981) and also the theory of undifferentiated products with free entry (Perry, 1982). Costrell (1985) extended this work to cover differentiated of activities undertaken, n, is independent of the number of activities undertaken by the firm in question. This is the usual competitive assumption, and is also the assumption justified by consistent conjectures under free entry, as discussed in Section 5. 8 The conditionality of the statement "n is insufficient, given X," can in fact be removed. That is, it can be shown (assuming stability of the number of firms and assuming Y and -a are normal goods) that the price-taking solution has fewer (and larger) activities than is optimal. Also, the total amount of risky investment, X, is smaller than is optimal, as is mean output, Y.
9 I am grateful to Stephen Salant and an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.
products with free entry. There it is shown that the Chamberlinian "large-group" assumption is the consistent conjecture, whether or not the group is large. Formally, suppose the price of differentiated commodity i can be written in the form Pi = P(Yi, n, S, X), 
using ( 
nO which is negative by (29). This result holds a fortiori for p'(n) > 0, i.e., when stochastic "crowding" mitigates the benefits of diversification. It tells us that welfare can be improved by reallocating X over a smaller number of risky firms, the opposite of what the previous section revealed for price-taking firms. Under consistent conjectures, then, perceived demand curves are so steep that firms produce at excessive average cost; they inefficiently trade off scale economies against the benefits of diversification'0
To summarize, we have seen that under consistent conjectures, imperfectly correlated firms no longer act as price-takers, so marginal cost pricing fails and insufficient resources are allocated to the risky sector. At the same time, the scale of each firm is reduced, and is, in fact, reduced so far that instead of having an insufficient number of firms, we have an excessive number.
These results have analogues in the theory of product differentiation. There, too, the failure of marginal cost pricing leaves a suboptimal level of resources for the differentiated sector. Also, under consistent conjectures there will be an excessive number of firms (Costrell, 1985) when there are diminishing returns to diversity, as when "crowding" phenomena (Salop, 1979) are important.
Conclusion
* Our analysis of the optimality of market allocations in a mean-variance world finds very different results depending on whether firms are price-takers or form conjectures consistently. Insofar as one is inclined to draw policy implications from such a model, they would also depend on pricing assumptions. If firms are price-takers, then full optimality requires lump-sum subsidies to firms on the basis of the number of risky activities, rather than their scale. Such a policy is of dubious behavioral feasibility, owing to agency problems, as Stiglitz (1975) indicated.
If firms form conjectures consistently, then full optimality requires a system of lumpsum taxes (to reduce the number of risky activities) coupled with subsidies on the mean output (or input) of risky firms (to offset the failure of marginal cost pricing). Such a policy, designed to encourage large firms and to discourage small firms, would certainly be of dubious political feasibility, especially in an environment of popular support for small-scale 10 In his 1972 paper and in part of his 1975 paper, Stiglitz took a slightly different pricing assumption. In the second line of our equation (26), he took the Cournot assumption with respect to the term (yi + p Z yj). Hence, joi for him, dpi/dyi = -ME(E2)/)ra, which gives a steeper conjectured demand curve than (27) for p > 0. Hence, the signs of (28) and (30) hold afortiori under this pricing assumption.
It is not hard to see that welfare could be improved if somehow firms were to perceive demand curves with a slope somewhere between zero and that of the consistent conjecture, for at a slope of zero we saw that Yx -Max = 0 and Yn -Mu, > 0. As we raise the slope (in absolute value), we know that Yx -Max goes negative and Yn -Mu,, falls toward zero. Initially, the fall of Yn -Mu,, toward zero raises welfare by more than the secondorder effect of moving Yx -Max away from zero. Clearly, however, once Yn -Mu,, has been pushed below zero, as it has under consistent conjectures, then we have gone farther than we should.
